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Abstract
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples, which becomes one of the most important research
problems in the development of deep learning. While a lot of
efforts have been made in recent years, it is of great signif-
icance to perform correct and complete evaluations of the
adversarial attack and defense algorithms. In this paper, we
establish a comprehensive, rigorous, and coherent bench-
mark to evaluate adversarial robustness on image classifi-
cation tasks. After briefly reviewing plenty of representative
attack and defense methods, we perform large-scale exper-
iments with two robustness curves as the fair-minded eval-
uation criteria to fully understand the performance of these
methods. Based on the evaluation results, we draw several
important findings and provide insights for future research.
1. Introduction
Recent progress in deep learning (DL) has led to sub-
stantial improvements in a wide range of computer vision
tasks [29, 22]. However, the existing DL models are highly
vulnerable to adversarial examples [55, 20], which are ma-
liciously generated by an adversary to make a model pro-
duce erroneous predictions. As DL models have been inte-
grated into various security-sensitive applications (e.g., au-
tonomous driving, healthcare, and finance), the study of the
adversarial robustness issue has attracted increasing atten-
tion with an enormous number of adversarial attack and de-
fense methods proposed. Therefore, it is crucial to conduct
correct and rigorous evaluations of these methods for under-
standing their pros and cons, comparing their performance,
and providing insights for building new methods [6].
The research on adversarial robustness is faced with an
“arms race” between attacks and defenses, i.e., a defense
method proposed to prevent the existing attacks was soon
evaded by new attacks, and vice versa [7, 8, 23, 1, 57, 67].
For instance, defensive distillation [43] was proposed to im-
prove adversarial robustness, but was later shown to be inef-
fective against a strong attack [8]. Many methods were in-
troduced to build robust models by causing obfuscated gra-
dients, which can be defeated by the adaptive ones [1, 57].
As a result, it is particularly challenging to understand their
effects, identify the real progress, and advance the field.
Moreover, the current attacks and defenses are often
evaluated incompletely. First, most defenses are only tested
against a small set of attacks under limited threat models,
and many attacks are evaluated on a few models or defenses.
Second, the robustness evaluation metrics are too simple to
show the performance of these methods. The accuracy of
a defense against an attack for a given perturbation bud-
get [31] and the minimum distance of the adversarial pertur-
bation [4] are used as the primary evaluation metrics, which
are often insufficient to totally characterize the behaviour
of the attacks and defenses. Consequently, the incomplete
evaluation cannot provide a comprehensive understanding
of the strengths and limitations of these methods.
In this paper, we establish a comprehensive, rigorous,
and coherent benchmark to evaluate adversarial robustness,
which can provide a detailed understanding of the effects
of the existing methods under different scenarios, with a
hope to facilitate future research. In particular, we focus on
the robustness of image classifiers under the `p norm threat
models, since the adversarial robustness issue has been ex-
tensively studied on image classification tasks with the `p
additive noises. We incorporate a lot of typical and state-of-
the-art attack and defense methods for robustness evalua-
tion, including 15 attack methods and 16 defense models—
8 on CIFAR-10 [28] and 8 on ImageNet [48]. To fully
demonstrate the performance of these methods, we adopt
two complementary robustness curves as the major evalua-
tion metrics to present the results. Then, we carry out large-
scale experiments on the cross evaluation of the attack and
defense methods under complete threat models, including
1) untargeted and targeted attacks; 2) `∞ and `2 attacks; 3)
white-box, transfer-based, score-based, and decision-based
attacks. We consider complete threat models for evaluation
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even if a defense does not claim to be robust under some
threat models, since the purpose of this paper is not to con-
tradict the previous results of some methods, but to provide
a comprehensive evaluation of the existing methods.
By analyzing the quantitative results, we have some im-
portant findings. First, the relative robustness between de-
fenses against an attack could be different under varying
perturbation budgets or attack iterations. Thus it is hard to
conclude that a defense is more robust than another against
an attack by using a specific configuration. However, this
is common in previous works. Second, although various
defense techniques have been proposed, the most robust de-
fenses are still the adversarially trained models. Their ro-
bustness can also generalize to other threat models, under
which they are not trained to be robust. Third, defenses
based on randomization are generally more robust to black-
box attacks based on the query feedback. More detailed
discussions can be found in Sec. 5.3.
All evaluation experiments are conducted on a new ad-
versarial robustness platform developed by us1, since the
existing platforms (e.g., CleverHans [41], Foolbox [46],
etc.) cannot fully support our comprehensive evaluations
(details in Appendix A). We hope that our platform could
continuously incorporate and evaluate more methods, and
be helpful for future works.
2. Threat Models
Precisely defining threat models is fundamental to per-
form adversarial robustness evaluations. According to [6],
a threat model specifies the adversary’s goals, capabilities,
and knowledge under which an attack is performed and a
defense is built to be robust. We first define the notations
and then illustrate the three aspects of a threat model.
A classifier can be denoted as C(x) : X → Y , where
x ∈ X ⊂ Rd is the input, and Y = {1, 2, ..., L} with L
being the number of classes. Let y denote the ground-truth
label of x, and xadv denote an adversarial example for x.
2.1. Adversary’s Goals
An adversary can have different goals of generating ad-
versarial examples. We study the untargeted and targeted
adversarial examples in this paper. An untargeted adversar-
ial example aims to cause misclassification of the classifier,
as C(xadv) 6= y. A targeted one is crafted to be misclassi-
fied as the adversary-desired target class by the classifier, as
C(xadv) = y∗, where y∗ is the target class.
2.2. Adversary’s Capabilities
As adversarial examples are usually assumed to be indis-
tinguishable from the corresponding original ones to human
eyes [55, 20], the adversary can only make small changes
1The source code will be released soon.
to the inputs. In this paper, we study the well-defined and
widely used `p norm threat models, although there also exist
other threat models [60, 53, 19]. Under the `p norm threat
models, the adversary is allowed to add a small perturbation
measured by the `p norm to the original input. Specifically,
we consider the `∞ and `2 norms.
To achieve the adversary’s goal, two strategies could be
adopted to craft adversarial examples with small perturba-
tions. The first seeks to craft an adversarial example xadv
that satisfies ‖xadv − x‖p ≤ , where  is the perturbation
budget, while misleads the model. This could be achieved
by solving a constrained optimization problem. For in-
stance, the adversary can get an untargeted adversarial ex-
ample by maximizing a loss function J (e.g., the cross-
entropy loss) in the restricted region as
xadv = arg max
x′:‖x′−x‖p≤
J (x′, y). (1)
We call it the adversarial example with a constrained per-
turbation. The second strategy is generating an adversarial
example by finding the minimum perturbation as
xadv = arg min
x′:x′is adversarial
‖x′ − x‖p. (2)
We call it the adversarial example with an optimized pertur-
bation. However, it is usually intractable to solve Eq. (1) or
Eq. (2) exactly, and thus various attack methods have been
proposed to get an approximate solution.
2.3. Adversary’s Knowledge
An adversary can have different levels of knowledge of
the target model, from white-box access to the model archi-
tectures and parameters, to black-box access to the training
data or model predictions. Based on the different knowl-
edge of the model, we consider four attack scenarios, in-
cluding white-box attacks, transfer-based, score-based, and
decision-based black-box attacks.
White-box attacks rely on detailed information of the tar-
get model, including architecture, parameters, and gradient
of the loss w.r.t. the input. For the defense models, the ad-
versary also has access to the specific defense mechanisms,
and designs adaptive attacks to evade them. Transfer-based
black-box attacks are based on the transferability of adver-
sarial examples [42]. These attacks do not rely on model in-
formation but assume the availability of the training data. It
is used to train a substitute model from which the adversar-
ial examples are generated. Score-based black-box attacks
can only acquire the output probabilities by querying the
target model. And decision-based black-box attacks solely
rely on the predicted classes of the queries. Score-based
and decision-based attacks are also restricted by a limited
number of queries to the target model.
2
3. Attacks and Defenses
In this section, we summarize the typical adversarial at-
tack and defense methods.
3.1. Attack Methods
White-box Attacks: Most white-box attacks craft ad-
versarial examples based on the input gradient. To solve
Eq. (1), the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [20] lin-
earizes the loss function in the input space and generates
an adversarial example by an one-step update. The basic
iterative method (BIM) [30] extends FGSM by iteratively
taking multiple small gradient steps. Similar to BIM, the
projected gradient descent method (PGD) [37] acts as a uni-
versal first-order adversary with random starts. To solve
Eq. (2), DeepFool [38] has been proposed to generate an
adversarial example with the minimum perturbation. The
Carlini & Wagner’s method (C&W) [8] takes a Lagrangian
form and adopts Adam [27] for optimization. However,
some defenses can be robust against these gradient-based
attacks by causing obfuscated gradients [1]. To circumvent
them, the adversary can use BPDA [1] to provide an ap-
proximate gradient when the true gradient is unavailable or
useless, or EOT [2] when the gradient is random.
Transfer-based Black-box Attacks: Transfer-based at-
tacks generate adversarial examples against a substitute
model, which have a probability to fool black-box models
based on the transferability. Besides the above methods,
some others have also been proposed to improve the trans-
ferability. The momentum iterative method (MIM) [15] in-
tegrates a momentum term into BIM to stabilize the update
direction during the attack iterations. The diverse inputs
method (DIM) [64] applies the gradient of the randomly re-
sized and padded input for adversarial example generation.
The translation-invariant method (TI) [16] further improves
the transferability for defense models.
Score-based Black-box Attacks: In this setting, al-
though the white-box access to the model gradient is un-
available, it can be estimated by the gradient-free methods
through queries. ZOO [9] estimates the gradient at each co-
ordinate by finite differences and adopts C&W for attacks
based on the estimated gradient. NES [25] and SPSA [57]
can give the full gradient estimation based on drawing ran-
dom samples and acquiring the corresponding loss values.
Prior-guided random gradient free method (P-RGF) [11]
estimates the gradient more accurately with a transfer-based
prior. NATTACK [32] does not estimate the gradient but
learns a Gaussian distribution centered around the input
such that a sample drawn from it is likely adversarial.
Decision-based Black-box Attacks: This setting is
more challenging since the model only provides discrete
hard-label predictions. The Boundary attack [3] is the first
method in this setting based on random walk on the decision
boundary. An optimization-based method [10] formulates
this problem as a continuous optimization problem and es-
timates the gradient to solve it. The evolutionary attack
method [17] is further proposed to improve the query effi-
ciency based on the evolution strategy.
3.2. Defenses
Due to the threat of adversarial examples, extensive re-
search has been conducted on building robust models to de-
fend against adversarial attacks. In this paper, we roughly
classify the defense techniques into five categories, includ-
ing robust training, input transformation, randomization,
model ensemble, and certified defenses. Note that these de-
fense categories are not exclusive, i.e., a defense can belong
to many categories. Below we introduce each category.
Robust Training: The basic principle of robust training
is to make the classifier robust against small perturbations
internally. One line of work is based on adversarial train-
ing [20, 56, 37, 26, 68], which augments the training data
by adversarially generated examples. Another line of work
trains robust models by regularizations, including those on
the Lipschitz constant [12], input gradients [24, 47], or per-
turbation norm [66].
Input Transformation: Several defenses transform the
inputs before feeding them to the classifier, including JPEG
compression [18], bit-depth reduction [65], total variance
minimization [21], autoencoder-based denoising [33], and
projecting adversarial examples onto the data distribution
through generative models [49, 52]. However, these de-
fenses can cause shattered gradients or vanishing/exploding
gradients [1], which can be evaded by adaptive attacks.
Randomization: The classifiers can be made random to
mitigate adversarial effects. The randomness can be added
to either the input [62] or the model [14, 35]. The random-
ness can also be modeled by Bayesian neural networks [36].
These methods partially rely on random gradients to prevent
adversarial attacks, and can be defeated by attacks that take
the expectation over the random gradients [23, 1].
Model Ensemble: An effective defense strategy in prac-
tice is to construct an ensemble of individual models [31].
Besides aggregating the output of each model in the ensem-
ble, some different ensemble strategies have been proposed.
Random self-ensemble [35] averages the predictions over
random noises injected to the model, which is equivalent
to ensemble an infinite number of noisy models. Pang et
al. [40] propose to promote the diversity among the predic-
tions of different models, and introduce an adaptive diver-
sity promoting regularizer to achieve this.
Certified Defenses: There are a lot of works [44, 51,
58, 59, 45, 61] on training certified defenses, which are
provably guaranteed to be robust against adversarial pertur-
bations under some threat models. Recently, certified de-
fenses [69, 13] can apply to ImageNet [48], showing the
scalability of this type of defenses.
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CIFAR-10 [28] ImageNet [48]
Defense Model Category Intended Threat Acc. Defense Model Category Intended Threat Acc.
Res-56 [22] natural training - 92.6 Inc-v3 [54] natural training - 78.0
PGD-AT [37] robust training `∞ ( = 8/255) 87.3 Ens-AT [56] robust training `∞ ( = 16/255) 73.5
DeepDefense [66] robust training `2 79.7 ALP [26] robust training `∞ ( = 16/255) 49.0
TRADES [68] robust training `∞ ( = 8/255) 84.9 FD [63] robust training `∞ ( = 16/255) 64.3
Convex [59] (certified) robust training `∞ ( = 2/255) 66.3 JPEG [18] input transformation General 77.3
JPEG [18] input transformation General 80.9 Bit-Red [65] input transformation General 61.8
RSE [35] rand. & ensemble `2 86.1 R&P [62] (input) rand. General 77.0
ADP [40] ensemble General 94.1 RandMix [69] (certified input) rand. General 52.4
Table 1: We show the defense models that are incorporated into our benchmark for adversarial robustness evaluation. We also show the defense type, original intended threat
model (i.e., the threat model under which the defense is trained to be robust or evaluated in the original paper; ‘General’ means the defense can be used for any threat model), and
accuracy (%) on clean data of each method. The accuracy is re-calculated by ourselves. More details about their model architectures are shown in Appendix B.
4. Evaluation Methodology
With the growing number of adversarial attacks and de-
fenses being proposed, the correct and rigorous evaluation
of these methods becomes increasingly important to help
us better understand the strengths and limitations of these
methods. However, there still lacks a comprehensive under-
standing of the effects of these methods due to the incorrect
or incomplete evaluations. To address this issue and further
advance the field, we establish a comprehensive, rigorous,
and coherent benchmark to evaluate adversarial robustness
empirically. We incorporate 15 attack methods and 16 de-
fense models on two image datasets in our benchmark for
robustness evaluation. We also adopt two complementary
robustness curves as the fair-minded evaluation metrics to
better show the results.
4.1. Evaluation Metrics
Given an attack method A,p that generates an adversar-
ial example xadv = A,p(x) for an input x with perturba-
tion budget  under the `p norm2, and a (defense) classifier
C defined in Sec. 2, the accuracy of the classifier against the
attack is defined as
Acc(C,A,p) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
(
C(A,p(xi)) = yi
)
,
where {xi, yi}Ni=1 is the test set, 1(·) is the indicator func-
tion. The attack success rate of an untargeted attack on the
classifier is defined as
Asr(A,p, C) = 1
M
N∑
i=1
1
(
C(xi) = yi∧C(A,p(xi)) 6= yi
)
,
whereM =
∑N
i=1 1
(
C(xi) = yi
)
, while the attack success
rate of a targeted attack is defined as
Asr(A,p, C) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
1
(
C(A,p(xi)) = y∗i
)
.
2For attacks that find minimum perturbations, e.g., DeepFool, C&W,
we letA,p(x) = x if the `p norm of the perturbation is larger than .
where y∗i is the target class corresponding to xi.
The previous methods usually report the point-wise ac-
curacy or attack success rate for some chosen perturbation
budgets , which may not reflect their behaviour totally. In
this paper, we adopt two complementary robustness curves
to clearly and thoroughly show the robustness and resis-
tance of the classifier against the attack, as well as the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of the attack on the classifier.
The first one is the accuracy (attack success rate) vs. per-
turbation budget curve, which can give a global understand-
ing of the robustness of the classifier and the effectiveness
of the attack. To generate such a curve, we need to calculate
the accuracy or attack success rate for all values of . This
can be efficiently done for attacks that find the minimum
perturbations, by counting the number of the adversarial ex-
amples, the `p norm of whose perturbations is smaller than
each . For attacks that craft adversarial examples with con-
strained perturbations, we perform a binary search on  to
find its minimum value that enables the generated adversar-
ial example to fulfill the adversary’s goal.
The second curve is the accuracy (attack success rate)
vs. attack strength curve, where the attack strength is de-
fined as the number of iterations or model queries based on
different attack methods. This curve can show the efficiency
of the attack, as well as the resistance of the classifier to the
attack, e.g., a defense whose accuracy drops to zero against
an attack with 100 iterations is considered to be more resis-
tant to this attack than another defense that is totally broken
by the same attack with 10 iterations, although the worst-
case accuracy of both models is zero.
4.2. Evaluated Datasets and Algorithms
Datasets: We use the CIFAR-10 [28] and ImageNet [48]
datasets to perform adversarial robustness evaluation in this
paper. We use the test set containing 10, 000 images of
CIFAR-10, and randomly choose 1, 000 images from the
ImageNet validation set for evaluation. For each image, we
select a target class uniformly over all other classes except
its true class at random, which is used for targeted attacks.
Defense Models: For fair evaluation, we test 16 repre-
sentative defense models whose original source codes and
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Attack Method Knowledge Goals Capability Distance
FGSM [20] white & transfer un. & tar. constrained `∞, `2
BIM [30] white & transfer un. & tar. constrained `∞, `2
MIM [15] white & transfer un. & tar. constrained `∞, `2
DeepFool [38] white un. optimized `∞, `2
C&W [8] white un. & tar. optimized `2
DIM [64] transfer un. & tar. constrained `∞, `2
ZOO [9] score un. & tar. optimized `2
NES [25] score un. & tar. constrained `∞, `2
SPSA [57] score un. & tar. constrained `∞, `2
NATTACK [32] score un. & tar. constrained `∞, `2
Boundary [3] decision un. & tar. optimized `2
Evolutionary [17] decision un. & tar. optimized `2
Table 2: We show the attack methods that are implemented in our benchmark for ad-
versarial robustness evaluation. We also show the adversary’s knowledge (white-box,
transfer-based, score-based, or decision-based), goals (‘un.’ stands for untargeted;
‘tar.’ stands for targeted), capability (constrained or optimized perturbations), and
distance metrics of each attack method.
pre-trained models are publicly available. These models
cover all defense categories and include the state-of-the-
art models in each category. On CIFAR-10, we choose
8 models—naturally trained ResNet-56 (Res-56) [22],
PGD-based adversarial training (PGD-AT) [37], DeepDe-
fense [66], TRADES [68], convex outer polytope (Con-
vex) [59], JPEG compression [18], random self-ensemble
(RSE) [35], and adaptive diversity promoting (ADP) [40].
On ImageNet, we also choose 8 models—naturally trained
Inception v3 (Inc-v3) [54], ensemble adversarial training
(Ens-AT) [56], adversarial logit pairing (ALP) [26], fea-
ture denoising (FD) [63], JPEG compression [18], bit-depth
reduction (Bit-Red) [65], random resizing and padding
(R&P) [62], and RandMix [69]. We use the natural mod-
els as the backbone classifiers for defenses based on in-
put transformation (e.g., JPEG). Table 1 shows the defense
details. The reason why we choose many weak defenses
based on randomization or input transformation, which are
already broken [1], is that we want to show their behaviour
under various threat models comprehensively, and we in-
deed draw some findings for these defenses.
Attacks: We implement 15 typical and widely used
attack methods in our benchmark, including 5 white-
box attacks—FGSM, BIM, MIM, DeepFool, and C&W, 4
transfer-based attacks—FGSM, BIM, MIM, and DIM, 4
score-based attacks—ZOO, NES, SPSA, and NATTACK,
and 2 decision-based attacks—Boundary and Evolutionary.
More details of these attacks are outlined in Table 2. Note
that 1) we do not evaluate PGD since PGD and BIM are
very similar and often result in similar performance; 2)
for transfer-based attacks, we craft adversarial examples by
those white-box methods on a substitute model; 3) for de-
fenses that rely on obfuscated gradients, we implement the
white-box attacks adaptively by replacing the true gradient
with an approximate one when it is unavailable or an ex-
pected one when it is random, such that the white-box at-
tacks can identify the worst-case robustness of the models.
Platform: All attacks and defenses are implemented on
a new adversarial robustness platform developed by us. We
also conduct the experiments based on the platform. The
comparisons between the existing platforms and ours are
detailed in Appendix A. We acknowledge that many good
works are not included in our current benchmark. We hope
that our platform could continuously incorporate and evalu-
ate more methods, and be helpful for future works.
5. Evaluation Results
We present the evaluation results on CIFAR-10 in
Sec. 5.1, and ImageNet in Sec. 5.2. Due to the space limita-
tion, we mainly provide the accuracy vs. perturbation bud-
get and attack strength curves of the defense models against
untargeted attacks under the `∞ norm in this section, and
leave the full experimental results (including targeted at-
tacks under the `∞ norm, untargeted and targeted attacks
under the `2 norm, and attack success rate curves) in Ap-
pendix C. We also report some key findings in Sec. 5.3.
5.1. Evaluation Results on CIFAR-10
In this section, we show the accuracy of the 8 models on
CIFAR-10 against white-box, transfer-based, score-based,
and decision-based attacks . To get the accuracy vs. pertur-
bation budget curves, we fix the attack strength (i.e., attack
iterations or queries) for different budgets. To generate the
accuracy vs. attack strength curves, we use a fixed pertur-
bation budget as  = 8/255 for `∞ attacks and  = 1.0 for
`2 attacks, with images in [0, 1]. The detailed parameters of
each attack are provided in Appendix B. We let the attack
parameters be the same for evaluating all defense models,
and leave the study of attack parameters on robustness per-
formance in future works. To better show the superiority of
the robustness curves adopted in this paper compared with
the previous evaluation criteria (i.e., the median distance of
the minimum adversarial perturbations [4] and the accuracy
of a model against an attack for a given perturbation bud-
get [31]), we show the evaluation results based on the pre-
vious evaluation criteria in Table 3.
White-box Attacks: We show the accuracy vs. pertur-
bation budget curves of the 8 models against untargeted
FGSM, BIM, MIM, and DeepFool attacks under the `∞
norm in Fig. 1 and leave the accuracy vs. attack strength
curves in Appendix C. The accuracy of the models drops
to zero against iterative attacks with the increasing pertur-
bation budget. Based on the results, we observe that un-
der white-box attacks, the adversarially trained models (i.e.,
PGD-AT, TRADES) are more robust than other models, be-
cause they are trained on the worst-case adversarial exam-
ples. We also observe that the relative robustness between
two models against an attack could be different under differ-
ent perturbation budgets or attack iterations (shown in Ap-
pendix C). For instance, the accuracy of TRADES is higher
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Attack Res-56 PGD-AT DeepDefense TRADES Convex JPEG RSE ADP
White
FGSM 0.005/21.6% 0.039/56.0% 0.001/9.2% 0.047/60.9% 0.017/36.6% 0.012/31.2% 0.020/29.0% 0.037/56.0%
BIM 0.002/0.0% 0.030/48.3% 0.001/0.0% 0.037/56.8% 0.016/34.3% 0.008/3.2% 0.018/23.5% 0.008/12.2%
MIM 0.003/0.0% 0.032/50.9% 0.001/0.0% 0.040/58.1% 0.016/34.9% 0.008/6.1% 0.019/25.1% 0.010/16.7%
DeepFool 0.003/0.0% 0.040/56.5% 0.001/0.0% 0.047/60.6% 0.015/32.9% 0.007/3.1% 0.021/35.9% 0.016/28.7%
Transfer
FGSM 0.067/72.9% 0.067/71.3% 0.048/62.1% 0.087/73.6% 0.050/57.5% 0.051/62.8% 0.048/62.0% 0.066/73.4%
BIM 0.049/70.3% 0.055/70.2% 0.041/58.8% 0.069/72.2% 0.044/56.7% 0.039/58.9% 0.041/60.0% 0.048/71.4%
MIM 0.052/71.5% 0.056/70.4% 0.041/59.4% 0.067/72.2% 0.045/56.6% 0.041/59.9% 0.043/59.8% 0.050/70.4%
DIM 0.052/73.3% 0.056/70.0% 0.043/58.8% 0.063/70.5% 0.044/55.3% 0.043/61.1% 0.043/60.2% 0.051/73.4%
Score
NES 0.004/0.0% 0.048/65.5% 0.002/0.0% 0.055/66.7% 0.025/44.0% 0.001/2.1% 0.293/79.7% 0.007/12.1%
SPSA 0.003/0.0% 0.042/61.1% 0.002/0.0% 0.049/64.9% 0.021/39.7% 0.001/2.1% 0.208/78.7% 0.007/9.7%
NATTACK 0.002/0.0% 0.030/48.6% 0.001/0.0% 0.037/55.8% 0.016/33.1% 0.000/0.0% 0.031/48.6% 0.005/2.4%
Table 3: The point-wise results of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted attacks under the `∞ norm given by the previous evaluation criteria. Each entry shows the
median `∞ distance of the minimum adversarial perturbations across all samples (left) as well as the models accuracy for the fixed  = 8/255 (right).
Figure 1: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 2: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
than that of PGD-AT against white-box attacks when the
perturbation budget is small (e.g.,  = 0.05), but is lower
when it is large (e.g.,  = 0.15). This finding implies that
the comparison between the defense models at a chosen per-
turbation budget or attack iteration, which is common in
previous works, cannot fully demonstrate the performance
of a model. But the robustness curves adopted in this pa-
per can better show the global behaviour of these methods,
compared with the point-wise evaluation results in Table 3.
Transfer-based Black-box Attacks: We show the accu-
racy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models against
untargeted transfer-based FGSM, BIM, MIM, and DIM at-
tacks under the `∞ norm in Fig. 2, and leave the accuracy
vs. attack strength curves in Appendix C. In this experi-
ment, we choose TRADES as the substitute model to at-
tack the others, and use PGD-AT to attack TRADES, since
these two models demonstrate superior white-box robust-
ness compared with the other models, and thus the adver-
sarial examples generated on the other models can rarely
transfer to TRADES and PGD-AT. From the results, the ac-
curacy of the defenses also drops with the increasing per-
turbation budget. We also observe that the recent attacks
(e.g., MIM, DIM) for improving the transferability do not
actually perform better than the baseline BIM method.
Score-based Black-box Attacks: We show the curves
of the accuracy vs. perturbation budget and accuracy vs.
attack strength (queries) of the 8 models against untargeted
score-based NES, SPSA, and NATTACK under the `∞
norm in Fig. 3 and Fig. 5. We set the maximum number of
queries as 20, 000 in these attack methods. The accuracy of
the defenses also decreases along with the increasing pertur-
bation budget or the number of queries. NATTACK is more
effective as can be seen from the figures. From the results,
we notice that RSE is quite resistant to score-based attacks,
especially NES and SPSA. We think that the randomness of
the predictions given by RSE makes the estimated gradients
of NES and SPSA useless for attacks.
Decision-based Black-box Attacks: Since the decision-
based Boundary and Evolutionary attack methods can be
only used for `2 attacks, we present the accuracy curves of
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Figure 3: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untar-
geted score-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 4: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on
CIFAR-10 against untargeted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 5: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted
score-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 6: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on
CIFAR-10 against untargeted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 7: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 8: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
the 8 models against untargeted Boundary and Evolution-
ary attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 4 and Fig. 6. The
behaviour of the defenses is similar to that of the score-
based attacks. It can be observed that RSE is also resistant
to decision-based attacks compared with the other defenses
due to the randomness of the predictions.
5.2. Evaluation Results on ImageNet
We present the experimental results on ImageNet in this
section. We use the same settings with those on CIFAR-10
to get the evaluation curves. Since the input image size is
different for the ImageNet defenses, we adopt the normal-
ized `2 distance defined as ¯`2(a) = ‖a‖2/
√
d as the measure-
ment for `2 attacks, where d is the dimension of a vector a.
To get the accuracy (attack success rate) vs. attack strength
curves, we fix the perturbation budget as  = 16/255 for
`∞ attacks and  =
√
0.001 for `2 attacks.
White-box Attacks: We show the accuracy vs. pertur-
bation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against
untargeted FGSM, BIM, and MIM under the `∞ norm in
Fig. 7. We also leave the accuracy vs. attack strength curves
in Appendix C. We find that FD exhibits superior perfor-
mance over all other models. FD is also trained by the ad-
versarial training method in [37], demonstrating the effec-
tiveness of PGD-based adversarial training on ImageNet.
Transfer-based Black-box Attacks: We use a ResNet-
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Figure 9: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untar-
geted score-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 10: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models
on ImageNet against untargeted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 11: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted
score-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 12: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on
ImageNet against untargeted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm.
152 model [22] as the substitute model. The accuracy vs.
perturbation budget curves of the defenses against untar-
geted transfer-based FGSM, BIM, MIM, and DIM under
the `∞ norm are shown in Fig. 8. Different from the results
on CIFAR-10, MIM and DIM improve the transferability
of adversarial examples over FGSM and BIM, resulting in
lower accuracy of the black-box models. A potential reason
is that the image size of ImageNet is much larger, and the
adversarial examples generated by BIM can “overfit” the
substitute model [15], making them difficult to transfer to
other black-box models.
Score-based and Decision-based Attacks: Fig. 9 and
Fig. 11 show the accuracy vs. perturbation budget and ac-
curacy vs. attack strength (queries) curves of the defense
models on ImageNet against untargeted score-based attacks
under the `∞ norm, while Fig. 10 and Fig. 12 show the two
sets of curves for untargeted decision-based attacks under
the `2 norm. Similar to the results on CIFAR-10, we find
that the two defenses based on randomization, i.e., R&P
and RandMix, have higher accuracy than the other meth-
ods in most cases. JPEG and Bit-Red that are based on
input transformations also improve the robustness over the
baseline model (i.e., Inc-v3).
5.3. Discussions
Based on the above results and more results in Ap-
pendix C, we highlight some key findings.
First, the relative robustness between defenses against
the same attack could be different under varying attack pa-
rameters, such as the perturbation budget or the number
of attack iterations. Not only the results of PGD-AT and
TRADES in Fig. 1 can prove it, but also the results in many
different scenarios show the similar phenomenon. Given
this observation, the comparison between defenses at a spe-
cific attack configuration cannot fully demonstrate the su-
periority of a method upon another. We therefore strongly
advise the researchers to adopt the robustness curves as the
major evaluation metrics to present the robustness results.
Second, among the defenses studied in this paper, we
find that the most robust models are obtained by PGD-based
adversarial training. Their robustness not only is good for
the threat model under which they are trained (i.e., the `∞
threat model), but can also generalize to other threat models
(e.g., the `2 threat model). However, adversarial training
usually leads to a reduction of natural accuracy and high
training cost. A research direction is to develop new meth-
ods that maintain the natural accuracy or reduce the training
cost. And we have seen several works [50] in this direction.
Third, we observe that the defenses based on random-
ization are quite resistant to score-based and decision-based
attacks, which rely on the query feedback of the black-box
models. We argue that the robustness of the randomization-
based defenses against these attacks is due to the random
predictions given by the models, making the estimated gra-
dients or search directions unreliable for attacks. A poten-
tial research direction is to develop more powerful score-
based and decision-based attacks that can efficiently evade
the randomization-based defenses.
Fourth, the defenses based on input transformations
(e.g., JPEG, Bit-Red) sightly improve the robustness over
undefended ones, and sometimes get much higher accuracy
against score-based and decision-based attacks. Since these
methods are quite simple, they may be combined with other
types of defenses to build more powerful defenses.
Fifth, we find that different transfer-based attack meth-
ods exhibit similar performance on CIFAR-10, while the
recent methods (e.g., MIM, DIM) can improve the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples over BIM on ImageNet.
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One potential reason is that the input dimension of the mod-
els on ImageNet is much higher than that on CIFAR-10, and
thus the adversarial examples generated by BIM can easily
“overfit” the substitute model [15], resulting in poor trans-
ferability. The recent methods proposed to solve this issue
can generate more transferable adversarial examples.
Note that these findings are based on our current bench-
mark, which may be strengthened or falsified in the future
if new results are given.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we established a comprehensive, rigor-
ous, and coherent benchmark to evaluate adversarial robust-
ness of image classifiers. We performed large-scale experi-
ments with two robustness curves as the fair-minded evalua-
tion criteria to facilitate a better understanding of the repre-
sentative and state-of-the-art adversarial attack and defense
methods. We drew some key findings based on the evalua-
tion results, which may be helpful for future research.
References
[1] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. Obfus-
cated gradients give a false sense of security: Circumventing
defenses to adversarial examples. In International Confer-
ence on Machine Learning (ICML), 2018. 1, 3, 5
[2] Anish Athalye, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, and Kevin
Kwok. Synthesizing robust adversarial examples. In Inter-
national Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2018. 3
[3] Wieland Brendel, Jonas Rauber, and Matthias Bethge.
Decision-based adversarial attacks: Reliable attacks against
black-box machine learning models. In International Con-
ference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2018. 3, 5, 13
[4] Wieland Brendel, Jonas Rauber, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas
Papernot, Behar Veliqi, Marcel Salathe´, Sharada P Mohanty,
and Matthias Bethge. Adversarial vision challenge. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1808.01976, 2018. 1, 5
[5] Nicholas Carlini. A critique of the deepsec platform for
security analysis of deep learning models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1905.07112, 2019. 12
[6] Nicholas Carlini, Anish Athalye, Nicolas Papernot, Wieland
Brendel, Jonas Rauber, Dimitris Tsipras, Ian Goodfellow,
and Aleksander Madry. On evaluating adversarial robust-
ness. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06705, 2019. 1, 2
[7] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Adversarial examples
are not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods. In
ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security, 2017.
1
[8] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Towards evaluating the
robustness of neural networks. In IEEE Symposium on Secu-
rity and Privacy, 2017. 1, 3, 5, 12
[9] Pin-Yu Chen, Huan Zhang, Yash Sharma, Jinfeng Yi, and
Cho-Jui Hsieh. Zoo: Zeroth order optimization based black-
box attacks to deep neural networks without training sub-
stitute models. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop
on Artificial Intelligence and Security, pages 15–26. ACM,
2017. 3, 5, 13
[10] Minhao Cheng, Thong Le, Pin-Yu Chen, Jinfeng Yi, Huan
Zhang, and Cho-Jui Hsieh. Query-efficient hard-label black-
box attack: An optimization-based approach. In Inter-
national Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR),
2019. 3
[11] Shuyu Cheng, Yinpeng Dong, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su, and
Jun Zhu. Improving black-box adversarial attacks with a
transfer-based prior. In Advances in Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems (NeurIPS), 2019. 3
[12] Moustapha Cisse, Piotr Bojanowski, Edouard Grave, Yann
Dauphin, and Nicolas Usunier. Parseval networks: Improv-
ing robustness to adversarial examples. In International Con-
ference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2017. 3
[13] Jeremy M Cohen, Elan Rosenfeld, and J Zico Kolter. Certi-
fied adversarial robustness via randomized smoothing. In In-
ternational Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2019.
3
[14] Guneet S Dhillon, Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Zachary C Lip-
ton, Jeremy Bernstein, Jean Kossaifi, Aran Khanna, and An-
ima Anandkumar. Stochastic activation pruning for robust
adversarial defense. In International Conference on Learn-
ing Representations (ICLR), 2018. 3
[15] Yinpeng Dong, Fangzhou Liao, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su, Jun
Zhu, Xiaolin Hu, and Jianguo Li. Boosting adversarial at-
tacks with momentum. In Proceedings of the IEEE Confer-
ence on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR),
2018. 3, 5, 8, 9, 12
[16] Yinpeng Dong, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su, and Jun Zhu.
Evading defenses to transferable adversarial examples by
translation-invariant attacks. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR), 2019. 3
[17] Yinpeng Dong, Hang Su, Baoyuan Wu, Zhifeng Li, Wei Liu,
Tong Zhang, and Jun Zhu. Efficient decision-based black-
box adversarial attacks on face recognition. In Proceedings
of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR), 2019. 3, 5, 13
[18] Gintare Karolina Dziugaite, Zoubin Ghahramani, and
Daniel M Roy. A study of the effect of jpg compression on
adversarial images. arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.00853, 2016.
3, 4, 5, 13
[19] Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, Dimitris Tsipras, Ludwig
Schmidt, and Aleksander Madry. Exploring the landscape of
spatial robustness. In International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML), 2019. 2
[20] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy.
Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In Inter-
national Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR),
2015. 1, 2, 3, 5, 12
[21] Chuan Guo, Mayank Rana, Moustapha Cisse, and Laurens
van der Maaten. Countering adversarial images using input
transformations. In International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2018. 3
[22] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun.
Deep residual learning for image recognition. In Proceed-
9
ings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR), 2016. 1, 4, 5, 8, 13
[23] Warren He, Bo Li, and Dawn Song. Decision boundary anal-
ysis of adversarial examples. In International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), 2018. 1, 3
[24] Matthias Hein and Maksym Andriushchenko. Formal guar-
antees on the robustness of a classifier against adversarial
manipulation. In Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing Systems (NeurIPS), 2017. 3
[25] Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Anish Athalye, and Jessy
Lin. Black-box adversarial attacks with limited queries and
information. In International Conference on Machine Learn-
ing (ICML), 2018. 3, 5, 13
[26] Harini Kannan, Alexey Kurakin, and Ian Goodfellow. Adver-
sarial logit pairing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.06373, 2018.
3, 4, 5, 13
[27] Diederik Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method for
stochastic optimization. In International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), 2015. 3, 12
[28] Alex Krizhevsky and Geoffrey Hinton. Learning multiple
layers of features from tiny images. Technical report, Uni-
versity of Toronto, 2009. 1, 4, 13
[29] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton.
Imagenet classification with deep convolutional neural net-
works. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Sys-
tems (NeurIPS), 2012. 1
[30] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Ad-
versarial examples in the physical world. In International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR) Workshops,
2017. 3, 5, 12
[31] Alexey Kurakin, Ian Goodfellow, Samy Bengio, Yinpeng
Dong, Fangzhou Liao, Ming Liang, Tianyu Pang, Jun Zhu,
Xiaolin Hu, Cihang Xie, et al. Adversarial attacks and de-
fences competition. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.00097, 2018.
1, 3, 5
[32] Yandong Li, Lijun Li, Liqiang Wang, Tong Zhang, and Bo-
qing Gong. Nattack: Learning the distributions of adver-
sarial examples for an improved black-box attack on deep
neural networks. In International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML), 2019. 3, 5, 13
[33] Fangzhou Liao, Ming Liang, Yinpeng Dong, Tianyu Pang,
Xiaolin Hu, and Jun Zhu. Defense against adversarial attacks
using high-level representation guided denoiser. In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR), 2018. 3
[34] Xiang Ling, Shouling Ji, Jiaxu Zou, Jiannan Wang, Chun-
ming Wu, Bo Li, and Ting Wang. Deepsec: A uniform plat-
form for security analysis of deep learning model. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2019. 12
[35] Xuanqing Liu, Minhao Cheng, Huan Zhang, and Cho-Jui
Hsieh. Towards robust neural networks via random self-
ensemble. In Proceedings of the European Conference on
Computer Vision (ECCV), 2018. 3, 4, 5, 13
[36] Xuanqing Liu, Yao Li, Chongruo Wu, and Cho-Jui Hsieh.
Adv-bnn: Improved adversarial defense through robust
bayesian neural network. In International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), 2019. 3
[37] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt,
Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. Towards deep learning
models resistant to adversarial attacks. In International Con-
ference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2018. 3, 4, 5,
7, 13
[38] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and
Pascal Frossard. Deepfool: a simple and accurate method
to fool deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR), 2016. 3, 5, 12
[39] Maria-Irina Nicolae, Mathieu Sinn, Minh Ngoc Tran, Ambr-
ish Rawat, Martin Wistuba, Valentina Zantedeschi, Nathalie
Baracaldo, Bryant Chen, Heiko Ludwig, Ian M Molloy,
et al. Adversarial robustness toolbox v0. 4.0. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1807.01069, 2018. 12
[40] Tianyu Pang, Kun Xu, Chao Du, Ning Chen, and Jun Zhu.
Improving adversarial robustness via promoting ensemble
diversity. In International Conference on Machine Learning
(ICML), 2019. 3, 4, 5, 13
[41] Nicolas Papernot, Fartash Faghri, Nicholas Carlini, Ian
Goodfellow, Reuben Feinman, Alexey Kurakin, Cihang Xie,
Yash Sharma, Tom Brown, Aurko Roy, et al. Technical re-
port on the cleverhans v2. 1.0 adversarial examples library.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768, 2016. 2, 12
[42] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ian Goodfellow,
Somesh Jha, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami. Practi-
cal black-box attacks against deep learning systems using ad-
versarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.02697, 2016.
2
[43] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh Jha,
and Ananthram Swami. Distillation as a defense to adver-
sarial perturbations against deep neural networks. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2016. 1
[44] Aditi Raghunathan, Jacob Steinhardt, and Percy Liang. Cer-
tified defenses against adversarial examples. In International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2018. 3
[45] Aditi Raghunathan, Jacob Steinhardt, and Percy S Liang.
Semidefinite relaxations for certifying robustness to adver-
sarial examples. In Advances in Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems (NeurIPS), 2018. 3
[46] Jonas Rauber, Wieland Brendel, and Matthias Bethge. Fool-
box v0. 8.0: A python toolbox to benchmark the ro-
bustness of machine learning models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.04131, 2017. 2, 12
[47] Andrew Slavin Ross and Finale Doshi-Velez. Improving the
adversarial robustness and interpretability of deep neural net-
works by regularizing their input gradients. In Thirty-Second
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2018. 3
[48] Olga Russakovsky, Jia Deng, Hao Su, Jonathan Krause, San-
jeev Satheesh, Sean Ma, Zhiheng Huang, Andrej Karpathy,
Aditya Khosla, Michael Bernstein, et al. Imagenet large
scale visual recognition challenge. International Journal of
Computer Vision, 115(3):211–252, 2015. 1, 3, 4, 13
[49] Pouya Samangouei, Maya Kabkab, and Rama Chellappa.
Defense-gan: Protecting classifiers against adversarial at-
tacks using generative models. In International Conference
on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2018. 3
10
[50] Ali Shafahi, Mahyar Najibi, Amin Ghiasi, Zheng Xu, John
Dickerson, Christoph Studer, Larry S Davis, Gavin Taylor,
and Tom Goldstein. Adversarial training for free! In Ad-
vances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS),
2019. 8
[51] Aman Sinha, Hongseok Namkoong, and John Duchi. Certi-
fying some distributional robustness with principled adver-
sarial training. In International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2018. 3
[52] Yang Song, Taesup Kim, Sebastian Nowozin, Stefano Er-
mon, and Nate Kushman. Pixeldefend: Leveraging genera-
tive models to understand and defend against adversarial ex-
amples. In International Conference on Learning Represen-
tations (ICLR), 2018. 3
[53] Yang Song, Rui Shu, Nate Kushman, and Stefano Ermon.
Constructing unrestricted adversarial examples with genera-
tive models. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems (NeurIPS), 2018. 2
[54] Christian Szegedy, Vincent Vanhoucke, Sergey Ioffe, Jon
Shlens, and Zbigniew Wojna. Rethinking the inception ar-
chitecture for computer vision. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR), 2016. 4, 5, 13
[55] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan
Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. In-
triguing properties of neural networks. In International Con-
ference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2014. 1, 2
[56] Florian Trame`r, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Dan
Boneh, and Patrick McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial train-
ing: Attacks and defenses. In International Conference on
Learning Representations (ICLR), 2018. 3, 4, 5, 13
[57] Jonathan Uesato, Brendan O’Donoghue, Aaron van den
Oord, and Pushmeet Kohli. Adversarial risk and the dangers
of evaluating against weak attacks. In International Confer-
ence on Machine Learning (ICML), 2018. 1, 3, 5, 13
[58] Eric Wong and Zico Kolter. Provable defenses against adver-
sarial examples via the convex outer adversarial polytope.
In International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML),
2018. 3
[59] Eric Wong, Frank Schmidt, Jan Hendrik Metzen, and J Zico
Kolter. Scaling provable adversarial defenses. In Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), 2018.
3, 4, 5, 13
[60] Chaowei Xiao, Jun-Yan Zhu, Bo Li, Warren He, Mingyan
Liu, and Dawn Song. Spatially transformed adversarial ex-
amples. In International Conference on Learning Represen-
tations (ICLR), 2018. 2
[61] Kai Y Xiao, Vincent Tjeng, Nur Muhammad Shafiullah, and
Aleksander Madry. Training for faster adversarial robustness
verification via inducing relu stability. In International Con-
ference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2019. 3
[62] Cihang Xie, Jianyu Wang, Zhishuai Zhang, Zhou Ren, and
Alan Yuille. Mitigating adversarial effects through random-
ization. In International Conference on Learning Represen-
tations (ICLR), 2018. 3, 4, 5, 13
[63] Cihang Xie, Yuxin Wu, Laurens van der Maaten, Alan L
Yuille, and Kaiming He. Feature denoising for improving
adversarial robustness. In Proceedings of the IEEE Confer-
ence on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR),
2019. 4, 5, 13
[64] Cihang Xie, Zhishuai Zhang, Yuyin Zhou, Song Bai, Jianyu
Wang, Zhou Ren, and Alan L Yuille. Improving transferabil-
ity of adversarial examples with input diversity. In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR), 2019. 3, 5, 12
[65] Weilin Xu, David Evans, and Yanjun Qi. Feature squeezing:
Detecting adversarial examples in deep neural networks. In
Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium (NDSS), 2018. 3, 4, 5, 13
[66] Ziang Yan, Yiwen Guo, and Changshui Zhang. Deep
defense: Training dnns with improved adversarial robust-
ness. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
(NeurIPS), 2018. 3, 4, 5, 13
[67] Huan Zhang, Hongge Chen, Zhao Song, Duane Boning, In-
derjit S Dhillon, and Cho-Jui Hsieh. The limitations of ad-
versarial training and the blind-spot attack. In International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2019. 1
[68] Hongyang Zhang, Yaodong Yu, Jiantao Jiao, Eric P Xing,
Laurent El Ghaoui, and Michael I Jordan. Theoretically prin-
cipled trade-off between robustness and accuracy. In Inter-
national Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), 2019. 3,
4, 5, 13
[69] Y. Zhang and P. Liang. Defending against whitebox adver-
sarial attacks via randomized discretization. In Artificial In-
telligence and Statistics (AISTATS), 2019. 3, 4, 5, 13
11
Appendix
A. Adversarial Robustness Platforms
There are several public platforms for adversarial ma-
chine learning, including CleverHans [41], Foolbox [46],
ART [39], etc. However, we observe that these platforms
do not totally support our comprehensive evaluations in this
paper. First, some attacks evaluated in this paper are not
included in these platforms. There are less than 10 out of
the 15 attacks adopted in this paper that are already imple-
mented in each platform. And most of the available meth-
ods are white-box methods. Second, although these plat-
forms incorporate a few defenses, they do not use the pre-
trained models. But we use the original source codes and
pre-trained models to perform unbiased evaluations. Third,
the evaluation metrics defined by the two robustness curves
in this paper are not provided in the existing platforms.
Therefore, we develop a new adversarial robustness plat-
form to satisfy our requirements.
Another similar work to ours is DeepSec [34], which
also provides a uniform platform for adversarial robust-
ness evaluation of DL models. However, as argued in [5],
DeepSec has several flaws, including 1) it evaluates the de-
fenses by using the adversarial examples generated against
undefended models; 2) it has some incorrect implementa-
tions; 3) it evaluates the robustness of the defenses as an
average, etc. We try our best to avoid these issues in this
paper. Our work differs from DeepSec in three main as-
pects: 1) we consider complete threat models and use vari-
ous attack methods in different settings; 2) we use the orig-
inal source codes and pre-trained models provided by the
authors to prevent implementation errors; 3) we adopt two
complementary robustness curves as the fair-minded evalu-
ation metrics to present the results. We think that our evalu-
ations can truly reflect the behavior of the attack and defense
methods, and provide us with a detailed understanding of
these methods.
B. Evaluation Details
In this section, we provide additional evaluation details.
Table 4 shows the network architecture of each defense
model. Below we show the details of the attack methods
as well as their parameters in our experiments. For clarity,
we only introduce the untargeted attacks.
FGSM [20] generates an untargeted adversarial example
under the `∞ norm as
xadv = x +  · sign(∇xJ (x, y)), (3)
where J is the cross-entropy loss. It can be extended to an
`2 attack as
xadv = x +  · ∇xJ (x, y)‖∇xJ (x, y)‖2 . (4)
To get the accuracy (attack success rate) vs. perturbation
budget curves, we perform a line search followed by a bi-
nary search on  to find its minimum value.
BIM [30] extends FGSM by iteratively taking multiple
small gradient updates as
xadvt+1 = clipx,
(
xadvt + α · sign(∇xJ (xadvt , y))
)
, (5)
where clipx, projects the adversarial example to satisfy the
`∞ constrain and α is the step size. It can also be extended
to an `2 attack similar to FGSM. For most experiments, we
set α = 0.15 · . To get the accuracy (attack success rate)
vs. perturbation budget curves, we also perform a binary
search on . For each  during the binary search, we set the
number of iterations as 20 in white-box attacks and 10 in
transfer-based attacks.
MIM [15] integrates a momentum term into BIM as
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xJ (x
adv
t , y)
‖∇xJ (xadvt , y)‖1
; (6)
xadvt+1 = clipx,(x
adv
t + α · sign(gt+1)). (7)
MIM can similarly be extended to the `2 case. We set the
step size α and the number of iterations identical to those in
BIM. We set the decay factor as µ = 1.0.
DeepFool [38] is also an iterative attack method, which
generates an adversarial example on the decision boundary
of a classifier with the minimum perturbation. We set the
maximum number of iterations as 100 in DeepFool, and it
will early stop when the solution at an intermediate iteration
is already adversarial.
C&W [8] is an optimization-based attack method, which
generates an `2 adversarial example by solving
xadv = arg min
x′
{‖x′ − x‖22
+c ·max(Z(x′)y −max
i6=y
Z(x′)i, 0)
}
,
(8)
where Z(x′) is the logit output of the classifier and c is
a constant. This optimization problem is solved by an
Adam [27] optimizer. c is found by binary search. To get
the accuracy (attack success rate) vs. perturbation budget
curves, we optimize Eq. (8) for 100 iterations. To get the
accuracy (attack success rate) vs. attack strength curves, we
optimize Eq. (8) for 10, 20, 30, 40 iterations on CIFAR-10,
and 10, 20 iterations on ImageNet to show the results.
DIM [64] randomly resizes and pads the input, and uses
the transformed input for gradient calculation. It also adopts
the momentum technique. In our experiments, we set the
common parameters the same as those of MIM. For its own
parameters, we set the input x ∈ Rs×s×3 is first resized to
a rnd × rnd × 3 image, with rnd ∈ [0.9 ∗ s, s], and then
padded to the original size.
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CIFAR-10 [28] ImageNet [48]
Defense Model Architecture Defense Model Architecture
Res-56 [22] ResNet-56 Inc-v3 [54] Inception v3
PGD-AT [37] Wide ResNet-34-10 Ens-AT [56] Inception v3
DeepDefense [66] 5-layer CNN ALP [26] ResNet-50
TRADES [68] Wide ResNet-34-10 FD [63] ResNet-152 with denoising layers
Convex [59] ResNet JPEG [18] Inception v3
JPEG [18] ResNet-56 Bit-Red [65] Inception v3
RSE [35] VGG R&P [62] Inception v3
ADP [40] ResNet-110 ×3 RandMix [69] Inception v3
Table 4: We show the network architecture of each defense model. Defenses based on input transformations use the baseline natural models as the backbone classifiers.
DeepDefense uses a very simple 5-layer CNN. FD modifies a ResNet-152 architecture with the proposed denoising layers. ADP ensembles the predictions of 3 ResNet-110
models. Convex uses a ResNet model with architecture provided in [59].
ZOO [9] has been proposed to optimize Eq. (8) in the
black-box manner through queries. It estimates the gradient
at each coordinate as
gˆi =
L(x + σei, y)− L(x− σei, y)
2σ
≈ ∂L(x, y)
∂xi
, (9)
where L is the objective in Eq. (8), σ is a small constant,
and ei is the i-th unit basis vector. In our experiments, we
perform one update with gˆi at one randomly sampled coor-
dinate. We set σ = 10−4.
NES [25] and SPSA [57] adopt the update rule in Eq. (5)
for adversarial example generation. Although the true gra-
dient is unavailable, NES and SPSA give the full gradient
estimation as
gˆ =
1
q
q∑
i=1
J (x + σui, y)− J (x− σui, y)
2σ
· ui, (10)
where we use J (x, y) = Z(x)y − maxi 6=y Z(x)i instead
of the cross-entropy loss, {ui}qi=1 are the random vec-
tors sampled from a Gaussian distribution in NES, and a
Rademacher distribution in SPSA. We set σ = 0.001 and
q = 100 in experiments.
NATTACK [32] does not estimate the gradient but
learns a Gaussian distribution centered around the input
such that a sample drawn from it is likely an adversarial
example. We set the sampling variance as 0.1, the learning
rate as 0.02, the number of samples per iteration as 100 in
NATTACK.
The decision-based black-box attacks—Boundary [3]
and Evolutionary [17] rely on heuristic search on the deci-
sion boundary. They need a starting point, which is already
adversarial, to initialize an attack. For untargeted attacks,
we sample each pixel of the initial image from a uniform
distribution. For targeted attacks, we specify the starting
point as a sample that is classified by the model as the tar-
get class. We use the default hyperparameters of these two
attacks given by their authors.
C. Full Evaluation Results
We provide the full evaluation results in this section.
C.1. Full Evaluation Results on CIFAR-10
Attacks under the `∞ norm: We have shown some
of the accuracy curves of the defense models against un-
targeted attacks under the `∞ norm in Sec. 5.1. We next
show the remaining curves of untargeted attacks under the
`∞ norm, the curves of targeted attacks under the `∞ norm,
and the attack success rate curves. Fig. 13 shows the accu-
racy vs. attack strength curves of the defenses on CIFAR-
10 against untargeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 show the accuracy curves of the defenses
on CIFAR-10 against targeted white-box attacks under the
`∞ norm. Fig. 16 shows the accuracy vs. perturbation
budget curves of the defenses on CIFAR-10 against untar-
geted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm. Fig. 17
and Fig. 18 show the accuracy curves of the defenses on
CIFAR-10 against targeted transfer-based attacks under the
`∞ norm. Fig. 19 and Fig. 20 show the accuracy curves of
the defenses on CIFAR-10 against targeted score-based at-
tacks under the `∞ norm. Fig. 21 to Fig. 26 show the attack
success rate vs. perturbation budget and attack success rate
vs. attack strength curves of white-box, transfer-based, and
score-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on
CIFAR-10.
Attacks under the `2 norm: We show the accuracy
curves of the defenses on CIFAR-10 against untargeted and
targeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 27,
Fig. 28, Fig. 29, and Fig. 30. We show the accuracy curves
of the defenses on CIFAR-10 against untargeted and tar-
geted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 31,
Fig. 32, Fig. 33, and Fig. 34. We show the accuracy curves
of the defenses on CIFAR-10 against untargeted and tar-
geted score-based attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 35,
Fig. 36, Fig. 37, and Fig. 38. We show the accuracy curves
of the defenses on CIFAR-10 against untargeted and tar-
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Figure 13: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 14: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 15: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
geted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 4,
Fig. 6, Fig. 39, and Fig. 40. Fig. 41 to Fig. 48 show the at-
tack success rate vs. perturbation budget and attack success
rate vs. attack strength curves of white-box, transfer-based,
score-based, and decision-based attacks under the `2 norm
on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
C.2. Full Evaluation Results on ImageNet
Attacks under the `∞ norm: Similar to CIFAR-10, we
show the results of the remaining untargeted attacks, tar-
geted attacks under the `∞ norm, and the attacks success
rate curves here. Fig. 49 shows the accuracy vs. attack
strength curves of the defenses on ImageNet against un-
targeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm. Fig. 50
and Fig. 51 show the accuracy curves of the defenses on
ImageNet against targeted white-box attacks under the `∞
norm. Fig. 52 shows the accuracy vs. attack strength curves
of the defenses on ImageNet against untargeted transfer-
based attacks under the `∞ norm. Fig. 53 and Fig. 54 show
the accuracy curves of the defenses on ImageNet against
targeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm. Fig. 55
and Fig. 56 show the accuracy curves of the defenses on
ImageNet against targeted score-based attacks under the
`∞ norm. Fig. 57 to Fig. 62 show the attack success rate
vs. perturbation budget and attack success rate vs. attack
strength curves of white-box, transfer-based, and score-
based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on Im-
ageNet.
Attacks under the `2 norm: We show the accuracy
curves of the defenses on ImageNet against untargeted and
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Figure 16: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 17: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 18: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
targeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 63,
Fig. 64, Fig. 65, and Fig. 66. We show the accuracy curves
of the defenses on ImageNet against untargeted and targeted
transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 67, Fig. 68,
Fig. 69, and Fig. 70. We show the accuracy curves of the de-
fenses on ImageNet against untargeted and targeted score-
based attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 71, Fig. 72, Fig. 73,
and Fig. 74. We show the accuracy curves of the defenses
on ImageNet against untargeted and targeted decision-based
attacks under the `2 norm in Fig. 10, Fig. 12, Fig. 75, and
Fig. 76. Fig. 77 to Fig. 84 show the attack success rate
vs. perturbation budget and attack success rate vs. attack
strength curves of white-box, transfer-based, score-based,
and decision-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 mod-
els on ImageNet.
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Figure 19: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted score-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 20: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted score-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
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Figure 21: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of white-box attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 22: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of white-box attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 23: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 24: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 25: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of score-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 26: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of score-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
Figure 27: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 28: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm.
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Figure 29: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 30: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 31: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 32: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm.
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Figure 33: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 34: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 35: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted score-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 36: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against untargeted score-based attacks under the `2 norm.
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Figure 37: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted score-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 38: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10 against targeted score-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 39: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10
against targeted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 40: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on CIFAR-10
against targeted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm.
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Figure 41: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of white-box attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 42: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of white-box attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 43: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 44: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 45: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of score-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 46: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of score-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 47: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of decision-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 48: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of decision-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 49: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 50: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 51: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted white-box attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 52: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
27
Figure 53: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 54: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 55: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted score-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
Figure 56: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted score-based attacks under the `∞ norm.
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Figure 57: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of white-box attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 58: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of white-box attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 59: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 60: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of transfer-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 61: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of score-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 62: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of score-based attacks under the `∞ norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 63: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 64: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 65: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 66: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted white-box attacks under the `2 norm.
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Figure 67: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 68: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 69: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 70: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm.
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Figure 71: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted score-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 72: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against untargeted score-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 73: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted score-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 74: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against targeted score-based attacks under the `2 norm.
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Figure 75: The accuracy vs. perturbation budget curves of the 8 models on ImageNet
against targeted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm.
Figure 76: The accuracy vs. attack strength curves of the 8 models on ImageNet against
targeted decision-based attacks under the `2 norm.
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Perturbation Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
Inc-v3
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Perturbation Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
Ens-AT
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Perturbation Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
ALP
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Perturbation Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
FD
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Perturbation Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
JPEG
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Perturbation Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
Bit-Red
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Perturbation Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
R&P
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Perturbation Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
tta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
RandMix
Untargeted FGSM Untargeted BIM Untargeted MIM Untargeted C&W Targeted FGSM Targeted BIM Targeted MIM Targeted C&W
Figure 77: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of white-box attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 78: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of white-box attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 79: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 80: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of transfer-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 81: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of score-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 82: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of score-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 83: The attack success rate vs. perturbation budget curves of decision-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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Figure 84: The attack success rate vs. attack strength curves of decision-based attacks under the `2 norm on the 8 models on ImageNet.
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